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1. Introduction 
 
This paper offers a model, calling upon the principles and techniques of input-output 
analysis, for the management of certain organisational problems within a group of 
companies. By “group” we mean a set of companies which, although characterised by 
different legal identities, have a single economic leadership (Azzini 1968; Saraceno 
1967, Zattoni, 2000) 
In particular, we consider the decisional and operational interactions which develop 
between a parent company and a subsidiary, with the aim of defining the 
organisational arrangements of the two companies according to economic criteria. 
The theme is of particular interest for the groups that have their origins in mergers 
and acquisitions, since the firms thus acquired often have organisational structures 
resulting from previous strategies which, after the acquisition, undergo substantial 
modifications. The restructuring of these acquired firms represents a crucial phase of 
the post-acquisition process (Colombo 1992; Colombo e Conca 2000; Haspeslagh – 
Jemison 1991), on which often depends the success of such operations. This in fact 
involves organisational changes which encounter much resistance, since they are 
interpreted as the expression of power politics amongst groups of managers. The 
suggested model aims to tackle the problem in an objective fashion, thus providing 
evidence for decision-making and negotiation between the parent company and the 
subsidiary. The model applies above all to the dimensioning of the operational units 
(Rugiadini 1979) depending on the level of autonomy that is required in the 
relationship between the parent company and the subsidiary. 
The decisional and operational interactions correspond, in the model, to defined 
“level of control”, i.e. to greater or lesser degrees of centralisation of the functions of 
the parent company and, hence, lesser or greater degrees of autonomy of the 
subsidiary. By “level of control” we intend to define a concept encapsulating the 
degree of centralisation together with that of co-ordination, along the lines of ideas 
drawn from the literature on business strategy in multinational companies organised 
in group form. (See, among others, Porter 1985 e 1986; Yip 1989, 1992).  
The relative importance of the various organisational units in the parent company and 
the subsidiary are measured in terms of level of control and of human resources 
involved. The hypothesis adopted is that of a direct relationship between these two 
elements: a high level of control exercised by the parent company is taken to imply 
high use of human resources by the parent company and a correspondingly low 
human resource requirement by the subsidiary. 
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For greater precision, the level of control of one organisational unit on another should 
be analysed as a combination of two distinct types of centralisation: decisional and 
operational. Decisional centralisation involves a limited number of people having 
strong powers of direction over the whole organisation. Operative centralisation, on 
the other hand, is necessarily a function of the availability of sufficient human 
resources to undertake the relevant set of activities. In this paper we hypothesise, for 
simplicity, coincidence of decisional and operational centralisation, but the model can 
easily be “split”, so as to consider decisional and operational centralisation separately. 
The fundamental hypothesis is thus that a high level of control is taken to imply a 
high degree of decisional and operational centralisation and hence a high use of 
human resources, while a low level of control is taken to be characterised by a low 
level of decisional and operational centralisation and consequent limited use of 
human resources.  
In reality, cases of asymmetry between the two types of centralisation are not 
uncommon, with high levels of decisional centralisation being accompanied by low 
levels of operative centralisation, and vice versa. Service departments provide typical 
examples of low levels of decisional centralisation with high levels of operative 
centralisation, while the opposite situation occurs wherever the subsidiary has to 
request formal authorisation from the parent company before carrying out particular 
activities. One can thus have decentralised activities which are strictly co-ordinated 
(that is to say, with a substantial level of decisional centralisation); this is the case in 
decentralised sales management which responds to a group co-ordinator for the 
product range.  
The objective of the model, and hence of this paper, is to investigate the 
correspondence between the organisational structure of the parent company and that 
of the subsidiary, in the sense that the latter should be appropriate, in terms of people 
employed in various organisational units, to achieve the tasks delegated to it by the 
parent company.  
The main difficulty to be overcome in this process of investigation derives from the 
fact that, in reality, the organisational structures of the parent company and the 
subsidiary are not homogeneous. Organisational units within the parent company and 
the subsidiary do not match up with one another: functions carried out by a particular 
department or other unit in the parent company may be carried out by more than one 
unit in the subsidiary, and vice versa. It is therefore necessary to move, initially, 
towards a standardisation of organisational units. Such standardisation implies 
analysis of organisational rules (functional and procedural) of the respective 
structures and the reallocation of all activities into Standard Organisational Units 
(SOU) common to both the parent company and the subsidiary. By “organisational 
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unit” we mean a department or sub-department or any group of people working in an 
office or other workplace, effectively operating as a unit and convenient to define as a 
unit, within the company concerned. 
This paper is organised as follows:  
After this introduction, in the second section we present the model in the context of 
the parent company and, in the third, in the context of the subsidiary. The fourth 
section illustrates the mechanism of alignment of the levels of control of the 
subsidiary with the demands of the parent company, while the fifth section applies 
this mechanism to variations of the level of control within the parent company itself. 
In the sixth section, we present an application of the model to one of the principal 
Italian banking groups, and, in the seventh, some final remarks.  
The reader who looks in this paper for the standard input-output model and for the 
classical inverse matrix of Leontief will be disappointed. Nevertheless the authors 
maintain that “their contribution emphasises all characteristic dimensions of the 
input-output analysis with reference to: its methodological framework (a model is 
useful if it is successful in organising and interpreting real data); its hypotheses (the 
fixed coefficients considered as an approximation of the structural characteristics of a 
given system); its mathematics (matrix algebra)” (Preface of Wassily Leontief to 
Costa –Marangoni, 1995). 
 
 
2. The organisational model applied to the parent company 
 
In this section we present the organisational model applied to the parent company. Its 
construction requires: 
- definition of “Standard Organisational Unit” (SOU) 
- reallocation of employee numbers to the SOU; 
- determination of the levels of control exercised by the parent company  
The organisational structure of the parent company consists of m organisational units, 
each characterised by a group of activities carried out by a corresponding number of 
employees. The number of people employed in each of the m units within the parent 
company, are represented by ( )1×m  column vector E of employees per unit in the 
parent company: 
 








=
mE
E
E
Μ
2
1
E  
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where iE  represents the number employed in unit i of the parent company. The sum 
of the numbers in the column represents the total head count in the parent company.  
With a view to making the structures of the parent company and the subsidiary 
comparable, we must move towards standardisation, by reallocating all the parent 
company’s employees to n SOUs, as will be done also for the subsidiary. 
The SOU is a “virtual” unit, to which we hypothesise allocation of certain activities, 
in reality performed in various different units, according to reasonable criteria of 
homogeneity.  
This reallocation is achieved by analysing the activities performed by the units, 
identifying the individuals performing them and reallocating each activity and 
individual to the corresponding SOU. We thus obtain a ( )nm×  matrix F of 
reallocated employees per activity per SOU for the parent company: 
 








=
mnmm
n
n
FFF
FFF
FFF
Κ
ΜΟΜΜ
Λ
Λ
21
22221
11211
F  
 
where each element ijF  represents the number of employees in unit i of the parent 
company performing a particular activity, which are reallocated to SOU j of the 
parent company. 
The sums of the numbers in the columns of this matrix, represented by ( )n×1  row 
vector S, show employees per SOU for the parent company: 
 [ ]nSSS Κ21=S  
 
where each element jS  represents the total number of individuals allocated to the 
parent company’s SOU j. 
The need to standardise the organisational units of the parent company and the 
subsidiary arise from the substantial lack of homogeneity often present within a group 
of companies as a result of successive acquisitions, mergers, incorporations or 
consolidations. It may in fact happen that the work of two particular departments in 
the parent company are in fact carried out by a single department in the subsidiary, or 
vice versa.  
The detailed analysis of the activities to be reallocated to the different SOUs, 
achieved with reference to job descriptions, permits identification of the level of 
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control, for each activity, exercised by the parent company as opposed to the 
subsidiary. On the basis of a conversion table (Table 1) which associates with each 
word or key expression in the company regulations and job descriptions a particular 
level of control, it is possible to assign to each activity a value between 0 and k, 
where 0 represents a zero level of control and k the maximum level of control. High 
levels of control arise in those situations in which one expects the parent company to 
manage directly any activity for the group, or where the subsidiary has to request 
formal authorisation to take action. Whereas low levels of control exist in situations 
where the parent company delegates fully any activity to the subsidiary or guarantees 
support on demand.  
For instance, from the parent company’s regulations one can deduce whether, in the 
course of the process of budgeting, a departmental manager has to delegate budgetary 
responsibilities to the subsidiary’s management or, by contrast, takes fully centralised 
control of the relevant budget. Similarly, from the regulations it is possible to 
discover the rules for purchasing and supply logistics. In some cases, such functions 
may be fully delegated to the subsidiary; in others, there may be delegation only 
within certain limits of expenditure; in others there may be complete centralisation. 
We define ( )nm×  matrix G of the levels of control of activities by the parent 
company: 
 








=
mnmm
n
n
GGG
GGG
GGG
Κ
ΜΟΜΜ
Λ
Λ
21
22221
11211
G  
 
where each element ijG  represents the level of control (between 0 and k) which, for a 
particular activity, is exercise by the parent company.  
On the basis of matrices F and G it is possible to construct ( )1×m  vector M of the 
mean levels of control in the units of the parent company: 
 








=
mM
M
M
Μ
2
1
M  
 
where each iM  represents the weighted mean of the levels of control for the different 
activities performed by unit i of the parent company: 
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i
n
j
ijij
i E
GF
M
∑
== 1  . 
 
Similarly, it is possible to construct ( )n×1  vector T of the mean levels of control in 
the SOUs of the parent company: 
 [ ]nTTT Κ21=T  
 
where each jT  represents the weighted mean of the levels of control of the different 
activities performed by SOU j of the parent company: 
 
j
m
i
ijij
j S
GF
T
∑
== 1  . 
 
Again, on the basis of matrices F and G, we may construct ( )nm×  matrix Q of the 
levels of control per employee of the parent company: 
 








=
mnmm
n
n
QQQ
QQQ
QQQ
Κ
ΜΟΜΜ
Λ
Λ
21
22221
11211
Q  
 
the elements of which express the levels of control exercised by the parent company 
in relation to each employee in each activity, and are defined thus: 
 
ij
ij
ij F
G
Q =   for all i, j such that 0≠ijF  
 
0=ijQ   for all i, j such that 0=ijF  . 
 
The levels of control per employee reflect, to some extent, the qualifications of the 
individuals involved. This calculation can serve also to determine wage levels, skill 
requirements, and so on, of the personnel added to (or destined for) the organisational 
units characterised by a given level of control. (Airoldi 1980)  
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Comparing instead the number ijF  of employees in each activity to the mean level of 
control in the corresponding SOU, we obtain the coefficient: 
j
ij
ij T
F
H =  . 
Thus we obtain ( )nm×  matrix H of the employees per activity required for each level 
of control in the parent company: 
 












×








=×=








= −
n
mnmm
n
n
mnmm
n
n
T
T
T
FFF
FFF
FFF
HHH
HHH
HHH
100
010
001
ˆ
2
1
21
22221
11211
1
21
22221
11211
Κ
ΜΟΜΜ
Λ
Λ
Κ
ΜΟΜΜ
Λ
Λ
Κ
ΜΟΜΜ
Λ
Λ
)T(FH
The direct relationship between level of control and size of an organizational unit is 
clearly a simplification of the real situation, since this relationship depends in general 
on the quality of the human resources employed and on the level of information 
supplied and the technologies used. If the units of the parent company and the 
subsidiary are relatively homogeneous as regards the variables considered, we can 
consider the hypothesis of a direct relationship as sufficiently realistic. 
The sums of the columns of matrix H defines ( )n×1  vector R of the employees per 
SOU required for each level of control in the parent company: 
 [ ]nRRR Κ21=R  
 
where each element jR  represents the number of employees which SOU j of the 
parent company which must be employed, in total, to exercise one level of control. 
The elements jR  are thus equal to: 
 
j
jm
i
ijj T
S
HR == ∑
=1
 . 
 
 
3. The organisational model applied to the subsidiary 
 
In this section we apply the same process of analysis and standardisation, used for the 
parent company in the last section, to the subsidiary.  
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We hypothesise that the organisational structure of the subsidiary consists of r 
organisational units, each one involved in a range of activities each performed by a 
number of employees. So as to be able to compare the organisational structures of the 
parent company and the subsidiary, it is necessary to standardise by reallocating the 
employees in each organisational unit to the same set of SOUs as we used for the 
parent company.  
In the case of the subsidiary, this may often involve disaggregation to an extent much 
greater than was the case for the parent company. One often finds, in a subsidiary, a 
single department performing the activities covered by several distinct departments in 
the parent company.  
As for the parent company, we define the following vectors and matrices:  
- ( )1×r  column vector e of the employees per unit in the subsidiary: 
 








=
re
e
e
Μ
2
1
e  ; 
 
- ( )nr ×  matrix f of reallocated employees per activity per SOU for the subsidiary: 
 








=
rnrr
n
n
fff
fff
fff
Κ
ΜΟΜΜ
Λ
Λ
21
22221
11211
f  ; 
 
- ( )n×1  row vector s of the employees per SOU for the subsidiary: 
 [ ]nsss Κ21=s  ; 
 
- ( )nr ×  matrix g of the levels of control of activities by the subsidiary: 
 








=
rnrr
n
n
ggg
ggg
ggg
Κ
ΜΟΜΜ
Λ
Λ
21
22221
11211
g  ; 
 
- ( )1×r  vector m of the mean levels of control in the units of the subsidiary: 
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







=
rm
m
m
Μ
2
1
m  ; 
 
- vector t, with dimensions ( )n×1 , of the mean levels of control in the SOUs of the 
subsidiary: 
 [ ]nttt Κ21=t  ; 
 
- ( )nr ×  matrix q of the levels of control per employee of the subsidiary: 
 








=
rnrr
n
n
qqq
qqq
qqq
Κ
ΜΟΜΜ
Λ
Λ
21
22221
11211
q  ; 
 
- ( )nr ×  matrix h of employees per activity required for each level of control in the 
subsidiary: 
 












×








=×=








= −
n
mnmm
n
n
mnmm
n
n
t
t
t
fff
fff
fff
hhh
hhh
hhh
100
010
001
ˆ
2
1
21
22221
11211
1
21
22221
11211
Κ
ΜΟΜΜ
Λ
Λ
Κ
ΜΟΜΜ
Λ
Λ
Κ
ΜΟΜΜ
Λ
Λ
)t(fh  . 
 
- ( )n×1  vector r of the employees per SOU required for each level of control in the 
subsidiary: 
 [ ]nrrr Κ21=r  . 
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4. Alignment of the levels of control 
 
The model proposed for the standardisation of the organisational structure and the 
determination of levels of control for the parent company and the subsidiary provides 
two homogeneous and comparable frameworks with a view to identifying and 
overcoming structural divergence within the group.  
It may be, and in practice often is, the case that misalignment between the levels of 
control exercised by the parent company and those which the subsidiary believes are 
delegated to it. These misalignments should be eliminated to guarantee the effective 
and efficient operation of the overall organisation. Often, in fact, there will exist a 
policy to modify business practice progressively and informally as regards the 
respective ways in which things are done so as to avoid duplication of activities or 
omission.  
The model achieves alignment of the subsidiary’s organisation to the levels of control 
delegated by the parent company through the reorganisation of human resources in 
the various units, together, if necessary, with new appointments and redundancies. 
The process of realignment takes as starting-point a review of the (possible) 
differences between the SOUs of the parent company, based on the levels of control 
actually exercised, and the SOUs of the subsidiary, based on its presumptions about 
what is delegated to it. More precisely, we define a level of control as delegated to the 
subsidiary as the difference between the maximum level of control, k, and the level of 
control exercised by the parent company. Thus we define vector W, with 
dimensions ( )n×1 , of the mean levels of control in the SOUs delegated by the parent 
company to the subsidiary:  
 [ ]nWWW Κ21=W  
 
the elements of which are: 
 
jj TkW −=  . 
 
In the case of perfect perception, on the part of the subsidiary, of the levels of control 
delegated by the parent company, the values of vector W coincide with the value of 
vector t. Otherwise, the subsidiary should align itself to the parent company’s 
intentions, through adjustment of personnel employed in the various units.  
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The modelling process so far presented allows immediate determination of the 
number of employees in the various units needed by the subsidiary to achieve the 
levels of control assigned to it by the parent company. 
We simply proceed as follows:  
- we consider the relation: 
 
1ˆ −×= )t(fh  ; 
 
- we substitute, for the diagonal vector tˆ  of the mean levels of control in the SOUs of 
the subsidiary, the diagonal vector Wˆ  of the mean levels of control in the SOUs 
delegated by the parent company to the subsidiary and define matrix *f  by the 
equation: 
 
1ˆ −×= )W(*fh  
 
Solving for f*, we determine the ( )nr ×  matrix of the adjusted reallocation of 
employees for the subsidiary: 
 








×










=×=








=
nrnrr
n
n
rnrr
n
n
W
W
W
hhh
hhh
hhh
fff
fff
fff
Κ
ΜΟΜΜ
Λ
Λ
Κ
ΜΟΜΜ
Λ
Λ
Κ
ΜΟΜΜ
Λ
Λ
00
00
00
ˆ 2
1
21
22221
11211
**
2
*
1
*
2
*
22
*
21
*
1
*
12
*
11
Whf*  . 
 
Matrix φ , with dimensions ( )nr × , of the changes in number of employees per 
activity per SOU in the subsidiary, defined thus: 
 










=−=
rnrr
n
n
φφφ
φφφ
φφφ
Κ
ΜΟΜΜ
Λ
Λ
21
22221
11211
f*fφ  . 
 
This matrix shows the changes in numbers of people employed in various activities 
necessary to satisfy the levels of control defined by the parent company. Positive 
elements indicate a need for new appointments; negative elements indicate a need for 
redundancies. 
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The sums of the columns of matrix f* form a new row ( )n×1  vector s* the adjusted 
number of employees per SOU for the subsidiary: 
 [ ]**2*1 nsss Κ=s*  
 
where each element *js  represents the appropriate number of personnel for the 
subsidiary to allocate to SOU j. 
The sums of the rows of matrix *f  define ( )1×r  column vector *e  of the adjusted 
number of employees per unit in the subsidiary: 
 








=
*
*
2
*
1
re
e
e
Μe*  
 
where each element *ie  represents the appropriate number of personnel in each unit in 
the subsidiary. The sum of the elements of this vector represents the new total head 
count for the subsidiary. 
To check the alignment between the levels of control exercised by the parent 
company and the levels of control delegated to the subsidiary, it is necessary to 
construct the following: 
- ( )nr ×  matrix *g  of the adjusted levels of control of activities by the subsidiary:  
 








=
**
2
*
1
*
2
*
22
*
21
*
1
*
12
*
11
rnrr
n
n
ggg
ggg
ggg
Κ
ΜΟΜΜ
Λ
Λ
g*  
 
where each element *ijg , which represents the appropriate level of control (between 0 
and k) which the subsidiary exercises for each activity, as delegated by the parent 
company, is obtained from:  
 
ijijij qfg ×= **  ; 
 
- ( )n×1  vector *t  of the adjusted mean levels of control in the SOUs of the 
subsidiary: 
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[ ]**2*1* nttt Κ=t  
 
where each *jt  represents the weighted mean of the adjusted levels of control of the 
various activities performed by SOU j of the subsidiary: 
*
1
**
*
j
r
i
ijij
j s
gf
t
∑
==  . 
 
When alignment between the levels of control exercised by the parent company and 
the levels of control delegated to the subsidiary are perfect, we have equality:  
 
Wt =*  . 
 
 
5. Changes in levels of control for the parent company  
 
Further to the alignment of the subsidiary to the levels of control delegated by the 
parent company, the proposed model allows analysis of the situation in which the 
parent company decides to modify its own levels of control. In such circumstances, 
not only does the parent company need to revise its organisation appropriately but 
also there will be a knock-on effect on the subsidiary.  
Let us suppose that the parent company decides to modify its levels of control, as 
referred to SOUs, changing them to the values indicated in diagonal vector T~ : 
 










=
nT
T
T
~00
0~0
00~
~ 2
1
Κ
ΜΟΜΜ
Λ
Λ
T  . 
 
On the basis of these new levels of control we may construct, using the same 
methodology as for the case of the subsidiary:  
- ( )nm×  matrix F* of the adjusted reallocation of employees for the parent company: 
 










×










=×=








=
nmnmm
n
n
mnmm
n
n
T
T
T
HHH
HHH
HHH
FFF
FFF
FFF
~00
0~0
00~
~ 2
1
21
22221
11211
**
2
*
1
*
2
*
22
*
21
*
1
*
12
*
11
Κ
ΜΟΜΜ
Λ
Λ
Κ
ΜΟΜΜ
Λ
Λ
Κ
ΜΟΜΜ
Λ
Λ
THF*  ; 
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- ( )n×1  row vector S* of the adjusted employees per SOU for the parent company: 
 [ ]**2*1 nSSS Κ=S*  ; 
 
- ( )1×m  column vector E* of the adjusted employees per unit in the parent company: 
 








=
*
*
2
*
1
rE
E
E
ΜE*  ; 
 
- ( )nm×  matrix G* of the adjusted levels of control of activities by the parent 
company:  
 








=
**
2
*
1
*
2
*
22
*
21
*
1
*
12
*
11
mnmm
n
n
GGG
GGG
GGG
Κ
ΜΟΜΜ
Λ
Λ
G*  ; 
 
- ( )n×1  vector T* of the adjusted mean levels of control in the SOUs of the parent 
company: 
 [ ]**2*1* nTTT Κ=T  . 
 
It will be apparent that each element of vector T* should equal the corresponding 
element of diagonal vector T~ . 
On the basis of these values of T* it is then possible to construct vector W, and adjust 
the levels of control of the subsidiary accordingly, as already illustrated in section 4.  
 
 
6. Application of the model to one of the principal Italian banking groups. 
 
The practical application of the model presented in this section refers to the case of 
one of the principal Italian banking groups, born by the merge of some major banks. 
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The new group took the form of an operative Holding Company and a collection of 
other subsidiary institutions, mainly banks, previously part of the original banking 
companies. 
The operational arm of the Holding Company is a Corporate Centre, responsible for 
controlling the commercial sections (Retail, Private and Corporate) including 
hundreds of branches distributed throughout Italy.  
The setting up of the new Holding Company made it necessary to undertake an 
internal reorganisation with a view to redefining the organisational roles of 
management and operational units for the group in the process of merging. This 
situation made it imperative to draw up rules with a view to regulating the 
relationship between the new Corporate Centre and the subsidiaries.  
The fact that the Holding Company reorganisation was not accompanied by a 
corresponding reorganisation within the subsidiaries resulted in a misalignment 
between the levels of control exercised by the Holding Company and those which the 
subsidiaries believed to be allowed to exercise. 
Now let us apply the model to the realignment of organisational units and levels of 
control of central management of one of the subsidiary banks, according to the 
directives of the Holding Company.  
The Corporate Centre of the Holding Company consists of 22 units with 3308 
employees (Table 3a – Vector E). 
The subsidiary bank, a smaller scale organisation, operates in a market with regional 
characteristics where there are more than 100 branches. There is a Central Office, 
under control of the Holding Company, where there are 275 employees distributed 
over 12 units. (Table 3b – Vector e) 
An initial quantitative and qualitative analysis of the two organisations indicated 
substantial lack of homogeneity of scale and organisation.  
The Corporate Centre of the Holding Company, responsible for control of the 
subsidiary, is over ten times the size of the subsidiary, in line with its task of 
controlling the whole portfolio of subsidiaries.  
The organisational structure of the Corporate Centre of the Holding Company is 
based on a greater number of units involved in central management than is the case in 
the subsidiary. For instance, Financial Accounting and Management Control are 
separate units, whilst in the subsidiary these functions are performed by a single unit. 
In the same way, in the subsidiary there is a single combined unit under the title of 
General Affairs & Operations, which acts as a general secretariat also covering legal, 
administrative matters, purchasing, logistics, information systems and back office, 
whilst in the Holding Company such activities are split up between departments 
entitled Operations, Organisation and Legal & General Affairs. 
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The lack of homogeneity between the structures and the activities performed by the 
two organisations invite application of the process of standardisation proposed in this 
paper, with the aim of making the two organisations effectively homogeneous and 
comparable in terms of structure, human resources, activities and levels of control 
exercised.  
Standardisation requires the identification of an appropriate number of SOUs 
configured so as to permit a homogeneous description of the two organisations. For 
the case in hand, we identified and used 32 SOUs (Table 2). 
To standardise the structures, it was necessary to reallocate the 3308 employees in the 
22 units of the Holding Company and the 275 employees in the 12 units of the 
subsidiary bank to the 32 SOUs indicated. This reallocation was achieved after a 
careful reading of the job description for each of the two organisations and the 
matching of human resources to the different activities. The reallocation of 
employees per activity to the various SOUs is shown in matrix F (Table 4a) and f 
(Table 4b).  
The sums of the columns of matrices F and f give vectors S (Table 5a) and s (Table 
5b), of the total numbers of employees per SOU, for the Holding Company and the 
subsidiary respectively. The largest number of employees in the Holding Company 
are involved in providing services to the subsidiary, in particular in the SOU called 
Payment Systems (857.3 employees), Finance Back Office (620.6 employees) and 
Information Systems (405 employees). The human resources of the subsidiary bank 
are, instead, concentrated particularly in Operational Marketing (79.6 employees) and 
Procurement, Logistics and Safety (40.5 employees). 
It was then necessary to construct matrices G (Table 6a) and g (Table 6b) of the 
levels of control associated with the activities reallocated to the different SOUs. This 
operation required a careful reading and analysis of the job descriptions and 
translation of key expressions indicating levels of control into numerical values, 
between 0 and 5, (according to the conversion chart shown in Table 1). 
Tables 7a and 7b show, respectively, the vectors M and m of the mean levels of 
control in the units of the Holding Company and the subsidiary.  
Of particular interest are vectors T and t shown in Tables 8a and 8b. These vectors 
permit homogeneous description of the levels of control which the Holding Company 
intends to exercise and the levels of autonomy which the subsidiary bank believes it 
has. Through effective standardisation it is possible to provide comparative analysis 
and to show the misalignment 
The detailed analysis of vector T clearly identifies the heavy centralisation, by the 
Holding Company, of operational services (level of control 5 in the SOUs of Finance 
Back Office and Payment Systems; 4.4 in Procurement Logistics & Safety) and of 
XIV International Conference on I-O Techniques                                            Modelling Intra-Group Relationships 
 17
financial management and market access (level of control 5 in the SOU for Trading 
and 4.9 in the SOU Finance and Treasury). 
The further Tables 9a and 9b, 10a and 10b, 11a and 11b show, respectively, matrices 
Q and q of the levels of control per employee exercised by the Holding Company in 
relation to each employee in each activity, the matrices H and h of the employees per 
activity required for each level of control, vectors R and r of the employees per SOU 
required for each level of control; each pair of vectors or matrices, respectively, being 
for the Holding Company and the subsidiary bank.  
Analysis of the data in matrix Q indicates low levels of control by the Holding 
Company in relation to those engaged in operational services and high levels in the 
specialist functions (Finance & Treasury and Trading), whilst from vector R, read 
alongside values of vector T, we see that high numbers of employees in operational 
services are required to ensure the high level of control in this area (characterised by 
high effectiveness), whilst much smaller human resources are needed to achieve high 
levels of control for those SOUs characterised by greater specialisation (e.g Trading). 
On the basis of formalisation and standardisation of the organisational structures of 
the Holding Company and the subsidiary bank, it is possible to proceed towards 
alignment of the respective levels of control, through readjustment of the numbers of 
those employed in the various activities. 
Comparison between vector W of the mean levels of control in the SOUs as 
delegated by the Holding Company to the subsidiary bank (shown in Table 12) and 
vector t of the mean levels of control in the SOUs of the subsidiary bank (Table 8b) 
reveals a substantial misalignment between the intentions of the Holding Company 
and the effective action of the subsidiary bank. In some areas the subsidiary believes 
itself able to perform activities with complete autonomy (Corporate Banking, Credit 
Management, Finance Back Office and Payment Systems), whilst the Holding 
Company regards these activities as being fully centralised; for each of these SOUs 
the values in both T and t are 5.0 (See Tables 8a and 8b). In other situations (e.g. 
Asset Management, Product & Service Development, Risk Management, Strategic 
Marketing and Strategic Planning) we see that the opposite applies, such that the 
subsidiary operates within presumed limits of delegation which, in reality, are less 
stringent. 
In general, we see a prevalence of SOUs in which realignment will imply a reduction 
of the level of control exercised on the subsidiary and hence a reduction of the 
number of people employed. 
Matrix f* (Table 13) provides the adjusted reallocation of employees per activity in 
the corresponding SOU for the subsidiary. The sums of the columns and rows of this 
matrix are shown, respectively, in vectors s* (of the adjusted number of employees 
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per SOU for the subsidiary - Table 14) and vector *e  (of the adjusted numbers of 
employees per unit in the subsidiary - Table 15). The fact that the subsidiary bank 
believes itself able to exercise levels of control greater than those which the Holding 
Company has decided to delegate to it, following restructuring of the group, identifies 
a need for substantial re-sizing of the organisational structure of the bank, reducing 
the number of employees by 163, from 275 to 111.  
The units most affected by the re-sizing are General Affairs & Operations and Credit 
Management, consequent upon the total centralisation of operational services, already 
mentioned above, in the service department of the Holding Company. Some degree of 
re-sizing is also appropriate in the commercial departments which, in the original 
organisations, were able to operate autonomously.  
Tables 16 and 17 show, respectively, matrix *g  of the adjusted levels of control of 
activities by the subsidiary and vector m* of the adjusted mean levels of control in 
the units of the subsidiary.  
Finally, Table 18 contains vector *t  of the adjusted mean levels of control in the 
SOUs of the subsidiary. Comparison between this vector and vector W (Table 12) 
confirms fully the alignment of the levels of control of the subsidiary with those 
foreseen by the Holding Company, obtained through application of our model.  
 
 
7. Limitations and implications for future research and for operational 
applications.  
 
The model presented is based on certain simplifying and limiting assumptions, which 
could be reduced in effect in subsequent phases of research. The relationship between 
level of control and optimal unit size could be rendered more realistic through the 
introduction of other important variables such as the quality of the human resources 
employed and the extent of adoption of information systems and technologies 
allowing an increase in automation. 
The concept “level of control” encompasses a range of variables among which are 
centralisation and coordination. In the combination of these variables the parent 
company chooses its style of management. The model could be redeveloped in 
various other management contexts, using a situational approach in the style initiated 
by Lawrence – Lorshe 1967. 
As regards managerial implications, the model is a tool for simulation of relationships 
between a parent company and a subsidiary, stimulating increase of understanding 
through theoretical experimentation with the consequences of decisions concerning 
levels of control and unit size. Notwithstanding the limitations discussed above, the 
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model provides evidence, albeit to a first approximation only, for objective, rational 
decision-making concerning problems of organisational structure of businesses which 
form part of a group.  
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Table 1 – Conversion chart for definition of levels of control. 
 
Key expressions Level of 
Decisional 
Centralisation 
Level of 
Operational 
Centralisation 
Level of control
(mean) 
Centralised management 5 5 5  
Direct management 5 5 5 
Integrated management 5 5 5 
Direct carrying out 5 5 5 
Direct participation  3 5 4  
Functional responsibility 5 2 3.5 
Operational management  2 5 3.5 
Definition of strategic objectives 5 1 3  
Control 5 1 3 
Strategic lines 5 1 3 
Strategy 5 1 3 
To agree 4 2 3 
Check 4 2 3 
Delegation 4 2 3 
Organisational models 4 2 3 
Processes 4 2 3 
Validation 4 2 3 
Direct intervention 2 4 3 
Technical specification 2 4 3 
Technology 2 4 3 
Service contracts 1 5 3 
Approval 4 1 2.5 
Authorisation 4 1 2.5 
Criteria 4 1 2.5 
Directive 4 1 2.5 
Trend 4 1 2.5 
Instruction 4 1 2.5 
Norm 4 1 2.5 
Plans 4 1 2.5 
Planning 4 1 2.5 
Policies 4 1 2.5 
Regulations 4 1 2.5 
Co-ordination 3 2 2.5 
Methodology 3 2 2.5 
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Key expressions Level of 
Decisional 
Centralisation 
Level of 
Operational 
Centralisation 
Level of control
(mean) 
To promote 3 2 2.5 
Supervision 3 2 2.5 
Evaluation 3 2 2.5 
Representation 2 3 2.5 
Data collection 1 4 2.5 
Analysis 3 1 2 
Qualitative description  3 1 2 
Influence 3 1 2 
Guidelines 3 1 2 
Opinion  3 1 2 
Principles 3 1 2 
Priority 3 1 2 
To examine 3 1 2 
Agreements 2 2 2 
Involvement 2 2 2 
Co-operation 2 2 2 
Interaction 2 2 2 
Interface 2 2 2 
Mediation 2 2 2 
Monitoring 2 2 2 
Negotiation 2 2 2 
Proposal 2 2 2 
Overseeing 2 2 2 
Capital allocation 2 1 1.5 
Budget 2 1 1.5 
Consultation 2 1 1.5 
Input 2 1 1.5 
Advice 2 1 1.5 
Communication 1 2 1.5 
Contribution 1 2 1.5 
Information 1 2 1.5 
Support 1 2 1.5 
Supply 1 1 1 
Assistance 1 1 1 
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Table 2 – Standard Organisational Units. 
 
Alliances & Partnerships  
Asset Management  
Auditing  
Bad Loans Management  
Budget & Management Control  
Corporate Banking  
Credit Granting 
Credit Management  
Credit Policies & Monitoring  
Delivery Processes  
External Relations  
Finance & Treasury  
Finance Back Office 
Financial Accounting & Tax Management  
Human Resources: Operations 
Human Resources: Policies  
Integrated Channel Management 
Investment Banking  
Information Services 
Legal & General Affairs  
Operational Marketing  
Organisation  
Organisational Development  
Payment Systems  
Procurement, Logistics & Safety  
Product & Service Development  
Retail & Private Banking  
Risk Management  
Strategic Marketing  
Strategic Planning  
Subsidiary Administration 
Trading 
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Table 3a – Vector E of the employees per unit in the Holding Company 
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Table 3b – Vector e of the employees per unit in the subsidiary bank  
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Table 4a - Matrix F of the reallocated employees per activity per SOU for the Holding Company  
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Table 4b - Matrix f of the reallocated employees per activity per SOU for the subsidiary bank. 
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Table 5a - Vector S of the employees per SOU for the Holding Company. 
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Table 5b - Vector s of the employees per SOU for the subsidiary bank. 
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Table 6a - Matrix G of the levels of control of activities by the Holding Company. 
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Table 6b - Matrix g of the levels of control of activities by the subsidiary bank 
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Table 7a - Vector M of the mean levels of control in the units of the Holding Company 
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Table 7b - Vector m of the mean levels of control in the units of the subsidiary bank. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Direzione/Divisione m Vector
Financial Accounting & Management Control 3,9          
Commercial Area 1 5,0          
Commercial Area 2 5,0          
Commercial Area 3 5,0          
Commercial Area 4 5,0          
Auditing 3,1          
Selling & Distribution 3,9          
Credit Department 4,5          
Merchant Banking Division 4,7          
External Relations 2,7          
Human Resources 3,3          
General Affairs & Operations 4,4          
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Table 8a - Vector T of the mean levels of control in the SOUs of the Holding Company. 
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Table 8b - Vector t of the mean levels of control in the SOUs of the subsidiary bank. 
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Table 9a - Matrix Q of the levels of control per employee of the Holding Company. 
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Table 9b - Matrix q of the levels of control per employee of the subsidiary bank. 
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Table 10a - Matrix H of the employees per activity required for each level of control in the Holding Company. 
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Table 10b - Matrix h of the employees per activity required for each level of control in the subsidiary bank. 
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Table 11a - Vector R of the employees per SOU required for each level of control in the Holding Company. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
XIV International Conference on I-O Techniques                                   I-O For Corporate Governance 
18 
 
Table 11b - Vector r of the employees per SOU required for each level of control in the subsidiary bank. 
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Table 12 - Vector W of the mean levels of control in the SOUs delegated by the Holding Company to the subsidiary bank 
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Table 13 - Matrix f* of the adjusted reallocation of employees for the subsidiary bank 
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Table 14 - Vector s* of the adjusted number of employees per SOU for the subsidiary bank. 
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Table 15 - Vector e* of the adjusted number of employees per unit in the subsidiary bank. 
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Table 16 - Matrix g* of the adjusted levels of control of activities by the subsidiary bank. 
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Table 17 - Vector m* of the adjusted mean levels of control in the  unit of the subsidiary bank 
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Table 18 - Vector t* of the adjusted mean levels of control in the SOU of the subsidiary bank. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
